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Terry Copp 
The campaign in Malaya and the fall of 
Singapore have been the subject of many books 
and much name-calling. The best accounts 
clearly establish that the causes of the collapse 
were rooted in the Empire's failure to enlist, 
equip and train armed forces capable of carrying 
out the obligations and strategic commitments 
considered vital in London. Unfortunately, 
British commanders, in seeking to explain 
opera t ional failure, chose to single out 
Commonwealth and Indian forces for criticism.3 
The Australians in Singapore and the Canadians 
in Hong Kong bore the brunt of this criticism 
which was renewed in the early 1990s with the 
release of the uncensored versions of Lord 
Wavell's Report on Operations in Malaya and 
Singapore, June 19424 and Major-General C. 
Maltby's official account of the defence of Hong 
Kong.5 
The controversies stirred up by these 
documents did not serve the interests of the 
Empire-Commonwealth in the 1940s and did 
nothing to encourage Australians or Canadians 
to cherish ties with Britain in the 1990s, but 
they have been a boon for historians who wish 
to know more about what happened in 1941. In 
the last days before the surrender of Hong Kong 
orders were given to destroy documents , 
including message logs and War Diaries, which 
might provide assistance to the enemy. Thus the 
basic record of events was lost. But once settled 
in prisoner of war camps the senior British staff 
officers began to compile, "from memory," not 
only a narrative but a listing of events which was 
declared to be "morally the war diary of Fortress 
Headquarters."6 
It did not take long for rumours to spread 
about this endeavour and Canadian officers, 
convinced they and their troops would be made 
The series of disasters which marked the opening months of the war with Japan were 
unprecedented and disorienting giving rise to 
conspiracy theories and the search for scape 
goats. The destruction of the battleships at Pearl 
Harbour initially eclipsed all other catastrophes 
but even as President Roosevelt's opponents in 
Congress demanded an inquiry and circulated 
stories about how he had lured the Japanese 
into war, those who could th ink clearly 
recognized that the surprise attack, by uniting 
the American people behind the war, was really 
a defeat for Japan. ' When Hitler, in one of his 
many blunders, declared war on the United 
States the Pacific war was merged into the larger 
struggle. Since the US Navy's aircraft carriers 
were undamaged, its submarine arm intact, and 
the base at Pearl Harbor operational, the Chief 
of the General Staff, General George C. Marshall, 
was able to expand the American war effort 
without reversing the Europe-first policy to 
which both he and President Roosevelt were 
committed. 
If America emerged from the tragedy of Pearl 
Harbor stronger in every way that mattered the 
same could not be said for the British Empire 
and its Commonwealth. The sinking of the 
Prince of Wales and the Repulse on 10 December 
1941, the surrender of Hong Kong on 25 
December and the collapse of resistance in 
Malaya and Singapore in early 1942 marked the 
beginning of the end of the British Empire in 
the Far East. In 90 days forces under British 
command had lost two battleships, 200 aircraft 
and 166,000 men, 130,000 of whom were taken 
prisoner. The Empire had been humiliated, 
particularly in Malaya and Singapore, when "a 
garrison that outnumbered the attackers by 
more than five to two... was hounded to utter 
destruction in seventy days."2 
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attachment to the colonial authorities though 
they were at least preferable to the Japanese.11 
Compulsory military service was introduced 
for male British subjects, of European birth, 
while those of Portuguese extraction were 
allowed to volunteer. By 1941 the Hong Kong 
Volunteer Defence Corps (HKVDC) consisted of 
seven infantry companies, five artillery batteries, 
five machine gun companies and an armoured 
car platoon.12 The Hong Kong "volunteers" were 
to supplement the garrison of four infantry 
bat tal ions; the 2nd Royal Scots, the 1st 
Middlesex (MG) and two Indian Army units 2/ 
14 Punjabs and 5/7 Rajputs. Coastal Regiments 
of the Royal Artillery manned 29 guns, mostly 
6-inch howitzers. The air resources, three 
Vildebeeste Torpedo Bombers and two Walrus 
amphibians were of no consequence. Three of 
the four destroyers based on Hong Kong were 
ordered to sea before 7 December leaving HMS 
Thracian plus four gunboats and eight motor 
torpedo boats.13 
The basic plan for the defence of Hong Kong 
had been developed in 1937. A defensive line 
including pillboxes was built from Gin Drinkers 
Bay to Tide Cove, the narrowest, point on the 
Kowloon pen insu la . After the J a p a n e s e 
occupation of Canton plans were changed: the 
Gin Drinkers line was abandoned. No attempt 
would be made to defend the mainland.14 
Giving up the mainland and defending the 
Island made neither political nor military sense. 
There was less than a kilometreseparating 
Kowloon from Victoria and the main water 
reservoirs were in the New Territories. Hong 
Kong had 130 days reserve of food but there 
were bound to be serious water shortages in any 
protracted siege.15 It was these difficulties that 
led Major-General Edward Grassett to propose 
obtaining additional troops from Canada and as 
soon as the new commander, Major-General 
C.M. Maltby, was informed that "C" Force would 
be sent to Hong Kong he resurrected the 1938 
plan and began to restore the Gin Drinkers line, 
[see map Hong Kong: The Mainland] 
Maltby, an officer of the Indian Army who 
had commanded the Staff College at Quetta 
arrived in Hong Kong in July 1941 during the 
middle of a local crisis provoked by Japanese 
attacks on Hong Kong-based boats and the 
internat ional crisis provoked by J apan ' s 
scapegoats, responded. Major George Trist, who 
served as adjutant of the Winnipeg Grenadiers, 
wrote his Report on the Part Played by the 
Winnipeg Grenadiers in the Defence of Hong 
Kong in April 1942 while he was at North Point 
Camp. The report begins: 
Two important factors have decided me to 
compile this report without further delay and 
while still a prisoner of war... The first and most 
urgent one is the necessity for a very accurate 
recording of events as they occurred. This would 
not have so important but for the fact that it has 
become very evident that we (The Canadian 
Forces) are being blamed by the Imperial troops 
for the fall of Hong Kong. And while it is not 
definitely known that the Imperial Staff will 
adopt this attitude in their official report every 
precaution must be taken to ensure that any 
attempt to make "C" Force the scape goat is 
adequately challenged by a submission of the 
facts while they are still fresh in the memory.7 
The Royal Rifles compiled even more extensive 
accounts of their activities8 and it is this kind of 
mater ia l tha t the his tor ian mus t use in 
reconstructing the events of December 1941. It 
is therefore necessary to proceed carefully. It is 
not difficult to ask questions about the defence 
of Hong Kong it is just answers that are hard to 
come by. 
In 1941 the Crown Colony of Hong Kong, 
consisting of the island and the leased territories, 
had a population of 1.7 million about half of 
whom were recent refugees from the war in 
China. The population of European descent did 
not exceed 25,000, including the military 
garrison. The cities of Victoria and Kowloon 
accounted for most of this total but as many as 
150,000 lived afloat on Junks and Sampans. 
The Japanese had conquered the adjacent area 
of mainland China in October 19389 and by 
December 1941 the Japanese 23rd Army in 
South China deployed four divisions with 
substantial artillery as well as air and naval 
units.10 
The British government did not believe that 
Hong Kong could survive a determined Japanese 
attack and began evacuating European women 
and children in 1940. This decision, coupled 
with other problems in administering a colony 
deluged with refugees, led to charges of 
favouritism and corruption and, by the fall of 
1941, Hong Kong was a deeply divided 
community. The Chinese population felt little 
6 
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These post-conflict accounts are supported by 
the contemporary intelligence reports from Hong 
Kong which reflect little concern with military 
action against the colony and an optimistic view 
of events in Japan. The November summary, for 
example, doubted that Japanese preparations 
were more than a "general tightening up."18 
Before condemning Maltby and his staff for 
what proved to be uninformed views bolstered 
by racist stereotypes it would be well to try and 
u n d e r s t a n d why Br i t i sh and American 
commanders consistently underra ted the 
military effectiveness of the Japanese forces and 
doubted their willingness to begin a war against 
a major military power. The Japanese army had 
been involved in a military campaign to conquer 
China since 1938. Three years later the "China 
incident", as the Japanese called it, was far from 
over. Chaing Kai-Shek's nationalist army was 
intact and apparently growing in strength. The 
Japanese puppet government of Wang-Ching-Wei 
had lost what little credibility it had begun with. 
The failure to crush Chinese resistance, despite 
deploying 1.5 million troops on the mainland, 
did not suggest great military prowess. 
More important in western eyes was the 
record of the Japanese army in clashes with the 
Soviets. The Red Army had crushed Japanese 
7 
occupation of southern Indo-China. Maltby and 
the colony's governor, Sir Mark Young, do not 
seem to have acted with any sense of urgency, 
apparently convinced that war with Japan was 
unlikely and that Japanese troops were poorly 
trained. Maltby spoke to the Canadian officers 
shortly after their arrival and according to 
George Trist told them: 
the Japanese had only about 5,000 troops with 
very little artillery support... their troops were 
ill-equipped and not used to night fighting... their 
aircraft were for the most part obsolete and their 
pilots very mediocre, [they were] unable to do 
dive bombing due to poor eyesight.16 
Brigadier C. Wallis, a British Indian Army officer, 
who commanded the Mainland Brigade, told an 
interviewer that, 
The lack of any real belief that war was pending 
had astonished him. Col. Newnham GSOl, 
always regarded suggestions that the Japanese 
might be a serious threat as unpatriotic or even 
insubordinate. Brig. Wallis had tried to introduce 
into mainland schemes, tactics which would 
prepare for an enemy attack other than by the 
expected main road method. He spoke of the 
difficulty of getting the civil administration to 
release civilian property for the building of MG 
emplacements etc. The administration felt that 
this would be done during a "precautionary 
stage" which actually of course did not 
materialize.17 
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Asia. Maltby ordered that certain precautionary 
measures be taken but as late as 7 December 
he was reassuring London that reports of 
Japanese strength in the Canton area were 
"deliberately fostered by the Japanese who, to 
judge from the defensive preparations around 
Canton and in the frontier area appeared 
distinctly nervous of being attacked."22 
These extraordinary misjudgements may 
account for the lack of urgency in the final 
preparations for the defence of Hong Kong. When 
Maltby reactivated the 1938 defence plan the Gin 
Drinkers line had fallen into disrepair and 
"much work was needed to make the line fully 
operational."23 The Shing Mun Redoubt, a 
12-acre network of pillboxes, concrete fire 
trenches, underground shelters and an artillery 
observation post, which overlooked both roads 
to Kowloon, was restored to use but the troops 
who would occupy it were held in training camps 
until mid-November pending the arrival of the 
Canadians.24 
If their was little sense of urgency in Hong 
Kong there was even less in London where 
Churchill and the War Office insisted that war 
with Japan was unlikely. As late as 16 November 
the British War Cabinet continued to maintain 
that, "in the absence of extreme danger in the 
Far East," priority should be given to the Middle 
East where General Auchinleck's offensive was 
advances in 1938 and again in 1939 when, under 
the command of General Georgi Zhukov, the 
Soviets humiliated the Japanese army inflicting 
11,000 casualties on a force of 15,000. These 
defeats had led to some reorganization of the 
Japanese army, especially the development of 
a rmoured u n i t s , b u t little had been 
accomplished by the fall of 1941.19 
Supplementing this general view of the poor 
performance of the Japanese army was an 
exaggerated belief in the power of Chiang Kai-
Shek's forces. Much was made of the presence 
of three Chinese "armies" to the west of Canton 
and both the War Office and General Maltby seem 
to have believed that these forces would attack 
the Japanese and come to the relief of Hong 
Kong.20 Maltby, like his counte rpar t s in 
Singapore and Manila, was also unimpressed 
with the Japanese air arm which was said to be 
poorly trained and equipped with obsolete 
aircraft. It is not easy to understand how such a 
view remained dominant in military intelligence 
circles when the 'Zero' had been in operational 
use in China for over a year. One can only note 
that British intelligence on the Japanese armed 
forces was full of assumptions and little hard 
evidence.21 
By the end of November 1941 the 
international press was freely speculating about 
an imminent Japanese offensive in South East 
8 4
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about to begin. At that meeting Churchill insisted 
"that it would be a grave strategic error to move 
forces to the Far East."25 
When Churchill made this comment the War 
Cabinet was debating the reinforcement of 
Malaya and Singapore, Hong Kong was not 
mentioned, but military preparations in that 
colony were severely hampered by the generally 
low priority assigned to all Far Eastern matters. 
However, two issues of some importance to the 
defence of the colony could have been resolved 
without any impact upon the campaign in North 
Africa. The first was the recruiting of a battalion 
of Chinese volunteers to serve under British 
officers. Authority was not sought until October 
1941 and then took one month to grant. Recruits 
were required to be 5' 7" tall which eliminated 
most of the first 600 volunteers who appeared.26 
The second problem was the shortage of 
ammunition for the 2" and 3" mortars which was 
so grave that preliminary firing "could seldom 
be carried out,"27 so neither practice nor the 
registration of targets was possible. The arrival 
of the Canadians, who had been informed that 
they would be supplied with mortar bombs in 
Hong Kong, meant that the available supply had 
Right & Below: Troops of "C" Force en route to the Sham 
Shui Po Barracks, located on the mainland of Hong Kong, 
16 November 1941. 
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to be spread even more thinly. As General Maltby 
was to note in his Dispatch, mortar ammunition 
"in any appreciable quantity did not arrive until 
November and then only 70 rounds per battalion 
for war and practice... the two inch mortar 
situation was worse."28 
The arrival of the Canadians allowed Maltby 
to begin implementing his defence plans and the 
three battalions of the "Mainland Brigade" under 
Brigadier C. Wallis moved to the Gin Drinkers 
Line to begin digging in and wiring the positions. 
The Canadians were to serve together on Hong 
Kong Island under their own commander, Brig. 
John Lawson, who was also nominally in 
command of the 1st Middlesex Regiment, a 
machine gun battalion which was committed to 
manning 72 concrete pillboxes ringing the 
island. The two Canadian battalions were 
quartered at the barracks in Kowloon on the 
mainland and carried out "two 48 hour manning 
exercises" of designated areas on the island.29 
Were there alternatives to this defensive 
scheme which were within the resources and 
capacities of the garrison? It appears that 
Maltby's dispositions suffer from the classic 
problem of a perimeter defence where one is 
10 
weak everywhere. It is not second guessing to 
suggest that a defensive plan which places all 
battalions in line and provides a single company 
as a brigade reserve would not have won high 
marks at the Quetta Staff College which General 
Maltby directed. Is there an element of fatalism 
about these dispositions? Or are we examining 
preparations for a battle which Maltby was 
convinced would never take place? 
For the people and garrison of the colony 
war began at 0800 hours on 8 December several 
hours later than Pearl Harbor and the Japanese 
landings in Malaya. The first air attack destroyed 
the five RAF aircraft which had been ordered 
not to take off unless the opportunity to attack 
a capital ship or a cruiser developed.30 The 
Japanese ground attack was quickly underway 
with three infantry regiments, nine battalions, 
supported by three mountain artillery battalions, 
advancing on a broad front. Demolitions and 
rear guard "commando" actions imposed only 
minor delays on the Japanese and by dawn on 
9 December they were within sight of the main 
British defences. Brig. Wallis felt obliged to 
commit his only reserve to plug a gap in the line 
so the thinly held perimeter was all that stood 
in the way of the Japanese.31 
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Something very close to panic set in during 
the evacuation, not among the troops or even 
the civilian popu la t ion b u t a t Fo r t r e s s 
Headquarters. When evacuation was ordered the 
plan was to hold the Devil's Peak and two 
companies of the Rajputs moved to the Ma Lau 
Tong position without interference. The Royal 
Scots, with the Winnipeg company, the Punjab 
battalion and the balance of the Rajputs 
withdrew together with the field artillery and 
armoured cars. While this retreat to the island 
was underway the Japanese army's 229th 
Regiment moved cautiously forward making 
contact with the Rajputs at 1300 hours on 12 
December. The Japanese, encouraged by the 
ease with which they had overcome the main 
defensive line, attacked the Rajputs without 
prearranged artillery support and were beaten 
off with some of the heaviest casualties of the 
campaign.38 
Maltby's response to this was to withdraw 
the Rajputs to the Hai Wan position shortening 
the line and allowing him to bring one Rajput 
company and the field artillery to the island. 
These moves were safely accomplished during 
the night of 12/13 December but Maltby now 
decided to evacuate the remaining Rajputs dug-
in at Devil's Peak despite Brig. Wallis' protests.39 
In his Dispatch Maltby stated "that it was more 
important to have the Rajputs together to hold 
its sector of the Island defences"40 than to control 
Devil's Peak, a judgement which few observers 
would share. 
What comments may reasonably be offered 
about the first stage of the defence of Hong Kong? 
The British official historian noted that "judged 
by hopes and expectations the withdrawal was 
premature."41 C.P. Stacey, the Canadian official 
historian wrote "the defence of Hong Kong had 
begun very badly."42 Neither author developed 
any specific critique of the plans or their 
execution. General Maltby, who was well aware 
that his actions would be scrutinized, placed a 
good deal of the blame on the Royal Scots whose 
fighting qualities had "not inspired him." 
Needless to say, he offered no comment on his 
own performance. 
The most likely explanation for Maltby's 
behaviour during the five days of the mainland 
battle is that he assumed the real battle for Hong 
Kong would be fought in defence of the island 
and that he would need all available troops for 
11 
It may be important to note that information 
about the Chinese nationalist intentions reached 
Maltby during the first day. The British military 
mission in Chungking reported that operations 
to relieve Hong Kong would begin on 1 January 
though a postponement to 10 January might be 
necessary.32 Whatever Maltby may have thought 
of the Chinese role before 9 December he must 
have now realized that it could have little 
influence on the struggle to defend Hong Kong. 
Everything now depended upon holding the 
Gin Drinkers Line but the key position, the Shing 
Mun Redoubt, fell to an improvised night attack 
by a Japanese infantry battalion. The Japanese 
evidence mentions stubborn resistance but it is 
evident that the silent night attack achieved 
surprise and the position was quickly occupied. 
The comment of one Royal Scots officer on the 
events of the night may be quoted: 
I never met anyone who knew the redoubt.. .who 
believed it would be held with a force of less 
than one company. During the hours of 
darkness.. .it was without any value whatsoever -
a large isolated position spread across a hillside, 
its total armament a few widely-separated 
machine guns laid to fire along fixed lines.33 
These words were of course written in hindsight 
but it is not easy to understand how Brigadier 
Wallis imagined a single, widely-dispersed 
platoon could resist a night attack. Wallis himself 
claimed, in a postwar interview, that "he had 
continually pointed out the need for reserve 
forces" but had been overruled.34 
Wallis "urged the Commanding Officer of the 
Royal Scots to counterattack at first light."35 How 
this was to be accomplished with a half-strength 
company previously committed to its own sector 
was not clear and the CO declined to carry out 
the Brigadier's request. Maltby then ordered a 
company of the Winnipeg Grenadiers to the 
mainland to serve as a brigade reserve.36 But 
the loss of the redoubt seems to have shaken 
his confidence and he issued a warning order to 
prepare for the evacuation of the mainland at 
1000 hours on 10 December. The Japanese 
maintained pressure on the British forces and 
air attacks "continued spasmodically throughout 
the day" but the defences were still intact when 
Maltby decided to "evacuate the Mainland except 
for the Devil's Peak position..." under cover of 
darkness that night.37 
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the surrender of Hong Kong under certain 
conditions, it will be honourable. If not, I, 
'repressing my tears', am obliged to take action 
to overpower your forces.43 
This was a political rather than a military 
question and Sir Mark Young, the Governor of 
the Colony replied "acknowledging the spirit in 
which this communication is made but he is 
unable to in any circumstances to hold any 
meeting or parley on the subject of the surrender 
of Hong Kong." For public consumption a more 
strident reply claiming the colony "was strong 
enough to resist all attempts at invasion"44 was 
issued though its is unlikely anyone believed it. 
The stage was therefore set for the invasion 
of the island. Maltby's dispositions to meet the 
expected attack are illustrated in the map Hong 
Kong: Troop Posit ions. Once again it is 
impossible to ignore the very serious problems 
apparent in these arrangements. Maltby placed 
his four full strength infantry battalions plus the 
Hong Kong volunteers in an extended perimeter 
defence designating the Royal Scots, who had 
lost a quarter of their rifle strength and a good 
deal of their confidence, as fortress reserve. He 
divided the island into two sectors, and insisted 
on breaking up "C" Force, assigning the Royal 
that task. How precisely he proposed to defend 
the island is another matter which we shall 
shortly examine. We must also note the impact 
of events in the wider world. By 11 December 
the garrison of Hong Kong knew of the fate of 
the American fleet and that night the BBC 
announced the sinking of the Prince of Wales 
and the Repulse. Any chance of assistance for 
Hong Kong had disappeared. 
The Japanese commander, Lieutenant-
General Takashi Saki heard the same news and, 
given the haste of the British retreat to the island, 
assumed that the enemy might now capitulate. 
The text of the Japanese ultimatum of 13 
December 1941 read: 
Since our troops have joined battle I have gained 
possession of the Kowloon Peninsula despite the 
good fighting qualities of your men, and my 
Artillery and Air Force, which are ready to crush 
all parts of the Island, now await my order. Your 
Excellency can see what will happen to the Island 
and I cannot keep silent about it. You have all 
done your duty in defending Hong Kong so far, 
but the result of the coming battle is plain, and 
further resistance will lead to the annihilation 
of a million good citizens and to such sadness 
as I can hardly bear to see. If Your Excellency 
would accept an offer to start negotiations for 
8
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Rifles to Brig. Wallis' East Brigade leaving the 
Winnipeg Grenadiers with Lawson's West 
Brigade. Maltby offered no explanation of this 
decision which was in a sense necessitated by 
his equally unexplained decision to divide the 
island into two geographic sectors with the inter-
brigade boundary just east of the main north-
south road. Neither Brigadier was given effective 
control of his forces as all units were assigned 
to positions by Fortress Headquarters. Since 
there was no wireless communication available, 
command and control would depend upon 
existing buried lines and hand carried messages. 
Japanese preparations for invading the 
island were thorough if somewhat leisurely. 
Artillery and air bombardment were directed at 
vital points and especially against the pill boxes 
on the north shore, more than half of which were 
knocked out. After three days the Japanese again 
sent a surrender demand under a flag of truce. 
Maltby informed the War Office that the Japanese 
envoys were "apparent ly su rp r i sed and 
disconcerted when proposal was summarily 
rejected."46 The next evening after a further 
intensification of air and artillery strikes on the 
north coast the Japanese began their assault 
crossing of the narrow waters. 
In his official dispatch, Maltby states that 
although he expected "the attack from across 
the harbour because the route was short and 
could be given full artillery protection"46 he 
would not "disregard a possible attack from 
seaward" so he felt it necessary to position his 
forces so as to cover every contingency. This 
meant that the two Canadian battalions were 
widely dispersed along the southern side of the 
island leaving the two Indian battalions and the 
HKVDC to cover an eight mile stretch of coast 
including Victoria City, the docks and other built-
up areas. 
The Japanese concentrated their assault on 
a 4,000 yard front between North Point and 
Aldrich Bay, the sector defended by the 5/7 
Rajput battalion. Though the enemy took losses 
in the crossing all six assault battalions quickly 
overran the fixed defences. The entire weight of 
the Japanese attack fell on the Rajputs who lost 
most of their British and Indian officers in the 
first few hours. 
Wallis had created an East Brigade reserve 
by reinforcing "C" Company of the Royal Rifles 
with a platoon from each of the other rifle 
companies giving the Officer Commanding, 
Major Wells Bishop, a force of 200 men. The 
13 
A view across the Lye Mun Passage. The photo, taken from the Lye Mun Barracks (ruins visible in foreground) shows 
the short distance to the mainland which the Japanese crossed on 18 December 1941. Devil's Peak is visible at the right 
edge of the photograph taken in September 1945. 
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These two photos show the extremely rugged terrain of Hong Kong. Above: A view looking to the northwest across 
Repulse Bay. Visible is Castle Eucliffe directly behind the naval ship sitting in the Bay and the hotel set back from the 
water just to the right of centre. Below: Colonel Tanaka, one of the Japanese commanders in 1941 looks across Aldrich 
Bay to where his troops landed. This photo, taken in 1947 from Sai Wan Hill shows the town of Sau Ki Wan surrounding 
the bay, while the lower slopes of Mount Parker are visible leading out of the top left corner of the photo. 
10
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events of the night 18 /19 December are 
clouded by contradictory accounts as well as 
the fog of war.47 'C Company first attempted to 
regain the fort on Sai Wan Hill using two six 
inch howitzers and several platoons. They 
reached the fort but were unable to capture it. 
Their War Diary reports that Chinese "coolies," 
or Japanese disguised in peasant clothing were 
part of the force which occupied the fort.48 
The War Diary also notes the disordered 
retreat of elements of the Rajput battalion, some 
of whom were without weapons. It makes clear 
that the countera t tacks mounted by "C" 
Company during the hours of darkness were 
uncoordinated and unsuccessful. By dawn on 
19 December the Japanese had occupied Mount 
Parker, Mount Butler, and Jardine's Lookout and 
thus controlled the high ground in the northeast 
corner of the island.49 
Fortress Headquarters was quite out of touch 
with the situation insisting that relatively few 
Japanese were ashore and ordering a general 
counter-attack at daybreak on 19 December. 
Since most of the Royal Rifle and Winnipeg 
Grenadier companies were still in the coastal 
positions these orders would be difficult to carry 
out . Brigadier Lawson had located his 
headquar te r s , and tha t of the Winnipeg 
Grenadiers, at Wong Nei Chong Gap which 
dominated the main cross island road. From 
there he could control both the south facing 
companies on the coast as well as the Punjabs 
and Royal Scots to the north. When 'D' Company 
of the Grenadiers returned from the mainland 
he positioned it to protect the gap facing north. 
Unfortunately, the high ground to the east was 
in Walks' sector and there was no tie-in with the 
pill boxes on Jardines Lookout manned by the 
HKVDC and Middlesex Regiment.50 
Lieutenant-Colonel J.L.R. Sutcliffe, CO of the 
Grenadiers, had organized his headquarters 
company into three "flying columns" and it was 
these platoon sized units which were ordered to 
go to the relief of the men on Jardine's Lookout. 
These brave attempts failed as the position was 
firmly in Japanese hands. "A" Company of the 
Grenadiers was brought north to reinforce this 
thrust and was systematically destroyed by a well 
organized enemy. "All officers, NCOs and men 
were killed, wounded or taken prisoner,"51 so it 
is difficult to reconstruct what happened in any 
detail in this hastily improvised night attack. The 
best information comes from witnesses who 
provided information that led to the award of a 
Victoria Cross to Company Sergeant Major J. R. 
Osborn.52 
15 
A postwar picture showing Canadian positions at the Wong Nei Chong Gap. The main north-south road which 
bisects the island is visible running across the middle of the photo. 
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base in the hope of being able to organize an 
attack the next day. The Japanese pressed 
forward seizing Violet Hill and the Hotel at 
Repulse Bay. Wallis ordered the Royal Rifles to 
recapture the hill and clear the coast road on 
the morning of 20 December, a task well beyond 
the capacity of infantry without artillery, not 
to mention armoured support. "D" Company 
was able to climb a "steep cliff up to a water 
catchment" and work their way forward on the 
slope of Violet Hill. They ambushed a Japanese 
pack train and engaged other groups of the 
enemy but were brought under fire from the 
top of Violet Hill and forced to withdraw.56 
The next day, the 21st, found the Royals 
in desperate circumstances. "A" Company was 
holding ground at Repulse Bay, "C" Company, 
reduced from a strength of 177 to 68, was at 
Stanley Mound and the remaining companies 
were under orders to prepare a new attack 
towards the Wong Nei Chong Gap. "A" Company 
At first light it was the Japanese who were 
on the move breaking into the gap from several 
directions. Attempts to send reinforcements met 
with disaster.53 Lawson's headquarters were 
overrun and at 1000 hours he informed Maltby 
that the enemy was firing into the position at 
point blank range and that he was "going outside 
to fight it out."54 All that now stood in the way of 
the J a p a n e s e were two p la toons of the 
Grenadiers dug-in along the road. Their 
courageous stand, which according to Japanese 
accounts led to heavy Japanese casualties,55 
delayed the advance of 230th Regiment but the 
229th succeeded in reaching Deep Water Bay 
and splitting the island early on 20 December. 
[See map Hong Kong: The Battle] 
The Japanese advance in the East Brigade 
sector was equally successful. By dawn on 19 
December the Rajput battalion no longer existed 
as an organized formation and Wallis decided 
to withdraw his remaining forces to a secure 
12
Canadian Military History, Vol. 10 [2001], Iss. 4, Art. 2
http://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol10/iss4/2
Lieutenant-Colonel (later Brigadier) W.J. Home, 
Commanding Officer of the Royal Rifles of Canada, was 
the senior surviving Canadian officer at Hong Kong. 
of the Hong Kong Volunteers led the advance 
which ended abruptly when Japanese troops 
brought the leading troops under heavy fire. The 
day was spent in a series of costly attempts to 
stop the Japanese advance, including several 
platoon-level actions, which temporarily 
stabilized the front.57 
The situation in the western sector had also 
continued to deteriorate and sometime on the 
evening of 21 December Lieutenant-Colonel W.J. 
Home, now the senior surviving Canadian officer, 
spoke to Lieutenant-Colonel Sutcliffe, learning 
that what was left of the Grenadiers were holding 
the crest of Mount Cameron awaiting a Japanese 
attack. 
Lieut. Colonel Sutcliffe reported that his 
battalion had been terribly decimated and also 
that he had some argument with Higher 
Command about useless attacks which his 
regiment was ordered to make. He asked Brig. 
Home if he could not do something to stop what 
he considered a useless waste of lives.58 
Home decided it was time to end the pointless 
conflict and informed Brigadier Wallis that he 
wished to see the Governor. According to Wallis, 
Home stated that "his battalion was exhausted; 
further resistance would only result in the waste 
of valuable Canadian lives; as senior Canadian 
officer he felt a grave responsibility. "59 Wallis says 
Company Sergeant-Major J.R. Osborn, "A" Company, 
Winnipeg Grenadiers was killed in action on 19 December 
1941 and posthumously awarded the Victoria Cross 
that he persuaded Home to wait until morning 
and told him he could not ignore Maltby. The 
next morning Home was adamant, "he was more 
than ever convinced of the futility of resistance."60 
Relations between the senior Canadian and 
British officers were now poisoned by mutual 
hostility and distrust and Wallis came to believe 
Home was threatening a separate Canadian 
surrender. The Canadian officers had long since 
lost confidence in Wallis, Maltby and their staff 
officers who seemed willing to sacrifice as many 
men as necessary to ensure that the honour of 
the gar r i son and its c o m m a n d e r s was 
maintained. As the Royals 2IC, Major (later 
Brigadier) John H. Price put it: 
There were plenty of Canadian officers who had 
battle experience in the first war who were 
competent to judge as to the possibility of a 
successful outcome of the defence of the island. 
Consider the facts - The Island had been split in 
two by vastly superior Japanese forces. On the 
eastern brigade front, which included the Stanley 
Peninsula, the Royal Rifles and one company of 
the Hong Kong Volunteer Defence Force were the 
only troops who had fought continuously day 
and night, without rest, since the landing on the 
17th and were still carrying all the fighting. By 
the 21st they had been greatly reduced in fighting 
strength and by the 23rd to a strength of around 
500 all ranks. (It might be interesting to note 
that when troops in this sector were marched 
17 
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A battle-damaged, bullet scarred building on a ridge overlooking Repulse Bay. Photographed in September 1945. 
was a grave danger of a break through."63 
Lieutenant-Colonel Home was now close to 
mutiny. He protested demands for a daylight 
attack but when Wallis insisted, "D" Company, 
without receiving the promised artillery support, 
fought a battle which is said to have cost 26 killed 
and 75 wounded. While this was taking place 
Maltby and the Governor suddenly agreed to 
capitulate. The news reached the Royals three 
hours after the surrender when white flags began 
to appear on government buildings. 
The decision to surrender was apparently 
the product of developments in the western 
sector. On 21 December General Maltby's 
communique to the War Office indicated that 
resistance was almost at an end. According to 
General Sir John Kennedy, the Director of 
Military Operations in London: 
We had to decide whether to order the troops to 
fight it out or give the Governor permission to 
surrender as he wished to do... the psychological 
aspect was of overriding importance, particularly 
with an Oriental enemy. If we fought to the last 
round and the last man at Hong Kong, we should 
gain an indirect military advantage, in that the 
Japanese would judge our powers of resistance 
elsewhere by the same standard. Therefore my 
opinion was that, although it was an unpleasant 
decision, the garrison should be told to fight it 
out.64 
out of Stanley fort as Prisoners of War, they 
numbered over 2000). 
It required no great military genius to predict 
the outcome of the battle once the Japanese had 
landed on the island with their control of sea 
and air and great superiority in weapons and 
men. He felt, I think rightly, that he would be 
derelict in his duty to his men and to the 
Canadian Government if he did not 
communicate his conclusions to the highest 
authority. Also neither Home nor his officers had 
any faith in Brig. Wallis' judgement or in his 
conduct of operations. And who had better right 
than he had? He and his men were bearing the 
brunt of the fighting and knew from first hand 
knowledge the strength and armament of the 
forces against them. The Higher Command had 
consistently shown an inability to grasp realities 
of the situation and to pursue tactics which might 
have prolonged the struggle but could not have 
altered the final result.61 
It may well be that Wallis had also lost confidence 
in the direction of the campaign. He telephoned 
Maltby on the morning of the 24th and was told 
"you will not chuck it unless you run out of 
ammunition, water or food. Do not TALK of 
surrender. Put Col. Home in Hospital."62 The 
confrontation ended with a decision to allow the 
Royal Rifles 24 hours of rest which was to begin 
on Christmas Eve. The rest lasted less than eight 
hours for at 0230 hours on Christmas day the 
battalion was ordered back to the front as "there 
18 
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wanted to find out just what the situation was, 
what the enemy were doing, etc. So I fired my 
"Very" pistol. This was the very first time I had 
ever fired one. I got the angle slightly too high 
and lit up my own position and the surrounding 
country as well as the enemy's position and 
caused a hell of a commotion. At that time I had 
spent five years in the Mlitia, and had been on 
active service two years. This is the kind of 
training Canada gives her soldiers. If no other 
lesson is learned from our fiasco than this, it 
would be well worth the cost, in the efficiency of 
future Canadian Armies.66 
Before we judge the army of 1941 too harshly 
It may be worthwhile to ask if the government of 
Canada would send t roops who were 
inadequately equipped and trained for the task 
assigned to them into harms way today? We may 
also wish to discuss whether Canadian forces 
might again come under the orders of officers 
of limited competence in circumstances when 
the command and control function is deeply 
flawed? If we are certain that such situations 
will never exist again then we can congratulate 
ourselves, the lessons of Hong Kong and a host 
of other imperfect military operations have been 
learned, at least until the next international crisis 
explodes out of control. 
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